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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jacob M. Torrez appeals from the district court's restitution order entered 
following his conviction for aggravated driving under the influence. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
A police officer responded to a report of a disturbance at Kuna State Park. 
(PSI, p.3.) Witnesses reported that two males were threatening physical violence 
against people at the park. (Id.) The officer located the men, Jacob Torrez and 
Andrew Capcha, and observed that both had slurred speech and glassy 
bloodshot eyes. (Id.) The officer told the men not to drive and advised them he 
would call a taxi. (Id.) 
Shortly thereafter, Torrez drove away with Capcha as his passenger. 
(PSI, p.3.) Torrez struck a vehicle at a nearby intersection and fled the scene. 
(ld.) A police chase ensued, during which Torrez traveled at speeds exceeding 
100 mph. (ld.) Torrez then lost control of his vehicle, hit a tree, and rolled 
numerous times. (Id.) Both Torrez and Capcha sustained serious injuries. (Id.) 
The state charged Torrez with aggravated DUI, leaving the scene of an 
accident involving vehicle damage, and driving without privileges (third offense). 
(R., ppAO-42.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Torrez pled guilty to aggravated 
DUI and the state dismissed the remaining charges. (R., pp.95-107.) The district 
court imposed a unified 10-year sentence with three years fixed. (R., pp.105-
108.) 
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The state requested the court to order Torrez to pay a total of $82,837.61 
in restitution - $79,518.55 to Ada County Indigent Services for amounts paid on 
behalf of Capcha, $56 to Capcha himself, and the remainder to medical and 
insurance providers. (R., pp.115-116; Tr., p.15, L.23 - p.16, L.3.) Torrez did not 
challenge the state's calculation of damages, but argued that the court should 
reduce the restitution amount pursuant to principles of comparative negligence 
based upon Capcha's voluntary act of riding in a vehicle with a person he knew 
to be intoxicated. (Tr., pA, L.14 - p.15, L.14.) Torrez also argued that Ada 
County Indigent Services was not a "victim" pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304. (Tr., 
p.i0, L.20 - p.i2, L.25.) 
The district court declined to apply comparative negligence principles and 
determined that the Ada County Indigent Services was a victim pursuant to I.C. § 
19-5304. (Tr., p.20, L.i7 - p.26, L.i9.) The district court ordered Torrez to pay 
restitution as requested by the state. (R., pp.ii5-ii6.) Torrez timely appealed. 
(R., pp.ii7-i19.) 
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ISSUE 
Torrez states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it awarded 
$79,518.55 in restitution to Ada County Indigent Services? 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Torrez failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
declining to apply comparative negligence principles to Torrez's restitution order? 
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ARGUMENT 
Torrez Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Declining To Apply Comparative Negligence Principles To Torrez's Restitution 
Order 
A. Introduction 
Torrez contends that the district court abused its discretion when it 
declined to apply comparative negligence principles to its restitution order 
entered against Torrez. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-17.) Torrez's contention fails 
because the language of I.C. § 19-5304 does not require a district court to 
perform such an analysis. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation and construction of a statute presents questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
Idaho 796,798,102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,405, 
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed 
to the trial court's discretion, as guided by the factors set forth in I.C. § 19-
5304(7). State v. Higley, 151 Idaho 76, 78, 253 P.3d 750, 752 (Ct. App. 2010); 
State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 114, 190 P.3d 930, 933 (Ct. App. 2008); In Re 
Doe, 146 Idaho 277, 284, 192 P.3d 1101, 1108 (Ct. App. 2008). 
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C. Idaho Code § 19-5304 Does Not Require A District Court To Apply 
Comparative Negligence Principles To Restitution Determinations 
Because "the best guide to legislative intent" is the words of the statute, the 
interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute. State v. 
Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009). Where the statutory 
language is unambiguous, a court does not construe it but simply follows the law 
as written. McLean v. Maverick County Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 
P.3d 756, 759 (2006). Thus, if the plain language of a statute is capable of only 
one reasonable interpretation, it is the court's duty to give the statute that 
interpretation. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 
894-896, 265 P.3d 502, 507-509 (2011) (disavowing cases with language that 
Court might not give effect to unambiguous language of statute if such was 
"palpably absurd"). 
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) authorizes a court to "order a defendant found 
guilty of any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim to make 
restitution to the victim." Idaho crime victims are constitutionally entitled "[t]o 
restitution, as provided by law, from the person committing the offense that 
caused the victim's loss." Idaho Const. art. I, § 22 (7). Where there is a causal 
connection between conduct for which a defendant is convicted and the injuries 
suffered by the victim, a district court is required to order restitution "[u]nless the 
court determines that an order of restitution would be inappropriate or 
undesirable." I.C. § 19-5304(2). In determining whether to order restitution and 
the amount of such restitution, a district court is required to consider: "the amount 
5 
of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense; the financial 
resources, needs and earning ability of the defendant, and such other factors as 
the court deems appropriate." I.C. § 19-5304(7). 
Contrary to Torrez's contention on appeal, I.C. § 19-5304 does not require 
a district court to apply principles of comparative negligence and assign blame to 
a victim for his own economic losses. Torrez contends that such a requirement 
is implicit in the language of I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a) and (2), which limits restitution 
to those economic losses "resulting from the criminal conduct." (Appel/ant's brief, 
pp.11-14.) Torrez contends that any contrary interpretation would render this 
statutory language superfluous. (Id.) Torrez's contention fails. 
Language from I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a) and (2) restricting restitution to those 
economic losses resulting from criminal conduct does not require a district court 
to apply comparative negligence principles to restitution determinations, nor is 
that language superfluous. Instead, Idaho appellate courts have interpreted this 
language to require that "in order for restitution to be appropriate, there must be a 
causal connection between the conduct for which the defendant is convicted and 
the injuries suffered by the victim." State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 
P.3d 398, 401 (2011); State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 391-394, 271 P.3d 1243, 
1247-1250 (Ct. App. 2012). In Corbus, the Idaho Court of Appeals did not, as 
Torrez asserts (Appellant's brief, p.11), implicitly require a district court to apply 
comparative negligence principles in criminal restitution proceedings, it instead 
analyzed whether the victim's losses were actually or proximately caused by 
Corbus' criminal conduct, or by an intervening, superseding cause. Corbus, 150 
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Idaho at 602-606, 249 P.3d at 401-405 (holding that vehicle passenger's act of 
jumping from vehicle during police chase was actually and proximately caused by 
driver's criminal conduct for restitution liability purposes). 
While I.C. § 19-5304 thus requires a causal connection between criminal 
conduct and economic loss, it does not require a district court to analyze a crime 
victim's personal judgment that may have placed him or her in a position of 
vulnerability, unless that judgment constitutes an intervening actual or proximate 
cause of the economic loss. While Capcha certainly exercised poor judgment in 
voluntarily entering a vehicle with the intoxicated Torrez, his injuries were 
caused, for the purposes of restitution liability, by Torrez's criminal conduct. 
Capcha would not have been injured but for Torrez's criminal conduct. It was 
also reasonably foreseeable that harm to Torrez's passenger would flow from his 
criminal conduct of driving under the influence. 
This Court should therefore decline Torrez's invitation to look beyond the 
express language of I.C. § 19-5304 and require, for the first time, district courts to 
apply contributory negligence principles to restitution determinations. If the 
legislature wished to so constrain the district court's discretion, it could have 
done so, either by including a victim's own fault within the I.C. § 19-5304(7) list of 
factors a district court must consider before ordering restitution, or by including a 
provision allowing criminal defendants challenging restitution orders to assert any 
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defenses it could raise in civil actions. 1 Rather than create such provisions, the 
legislature provided a statutory scheme under which an individual is responsible 
for the economic damages actually or proximately caused by his crimes. 
Additionally, one of the purposes of the Idaho restitution statute is to obviate 
the need for victims to incur the cost and inconvenience of a separate civil action 
in order to gain compensation for their losses. State v. Parker, 143 Idaho 165, 
167, 139 P.3d 767, 769 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Waidelich, 140 Idaho 622,624, 
97 P.3d 489, 491 (Ct. App. 2004). This purpose would be compromised if I.C. § 
19-5304 were interpreted to require prolonged evidentiary hearings on the 
respective comparative negligence of criminals and victims. Idaho Code § 19-
5304 does not require a district court to replicate a civil action and determine a 
defendant's restitution liability in accordance with the strict rules of damages and 
fault attribution applicable to a civil case. See People v. Johnson, 780 P.2d 504 
(Colo. 1989) (holding that trial court erred in applying contributory negligence 
principles and by declining to award restitution to a passenger injured by an 
intoxicated driver's criminal conduct); see also Doe 146 Idaho at 285, 192 P.3d at 
1109 ("it is not the intent of [I.C. § 19-5304] to maintain the strict level of 
evidentiary requirements in restitution hearings that is required in trials.") 
Further, a mandatory comparative analysis of a crime victim's fault would 
be contrary to the intended benefits of criminal restitution derived by the state, 
which include the promotion of the "rehabilitative and deterrent purposes of the 
1For example, MCA § 46-18-244(2) expressly permits Montana criminal 
defendants to "assert any defense that the offender could raise in a civil action 
for the loss for which the victim seeks compensation." 
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criminal law." State v. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 378, 93 P.3d 708, 709 (Ct. App. 
2004); see also State v. Breeden, 129 Idaho 813,815-816,932 P.2d 936, 938-
939 (Ct. App.1997) ("A restitution requirement facilitates rehabilitation by 
confronting the defendant with the consequences of his or her criminal conduct 
and forcing the defendant to accept financial responsibility for the resulting 
harm.") As the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasoned in rejecting an argument 
similar to that made by Torrez in this case, "[tJo allow a defendant who has 
already been convicted of a crime to focus on the action of a victim to avoid 
restitution defeats this purpose [of rehabilitation and deterrence] to evade 
responsibility for his own actions." State v. Knoll, 614 N.W.2d 20, 24-25 (Wis. 
App.2000). 
Finally, even if the district court was required to apply comparative 
negligence principles in this case, it could only reduce the $56 amount it ordered 
Torrez to pay Capcha. As the district court concluded, Ada County Indigent 
Services, to whom the court ordered Torrez to pay $79,518.55, was a victim in its 
own right, and entitled to restitution.2 (Tr., p.21, L.15 - p.23, LA.) Torrez has not 
and cannot show that Ada County Indigent Services was itself somehow 
comparatively negligent, or that it was required to make its own comparative 
negligence determination before paying medical bills on behalf of Capcha. 
Because Torrez has failed to show that I.C. § 19-5304 requires a district 
court to consider a victim's comparative negligence in determining restitution, he 
2 Torrez has not challenged this determination on appeal. 
9 
has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion in declining to 
do so in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
restitution order. 
DATED this 19th day of August, 2013. 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of August 2013, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
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BEN PATRICK McGREEVY 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
MARK W. OLSON 'i 
Deputy Attorney General 
MWO/pm 
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